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Ernest Sosa’s recent book Knowing Full Well presents us with an account 
of empirical knowledge which amounts to nothing less than a remark-
able, sophisticated development of his well-known virtue epistemology. 
In his 1980 paper “The Raft and the Pyramid” Sosa maintained that the 
notion of intellectual virtue could help us break free from the stalemate 
created by the debate between foundationalism and coherentism about the 
nature of epistemic justification. Anyone who is familiar with this famous 
tug of war knows the respective arguments in their essence. On the one 
hand, coherentists always strived to reassure theoreticians of knowledge 
that coherent doxastic webs need not amount merely to barren abstract 
structures but rather are explanatory systems which, appropriately con-
structed, can account for actual agents’ reliable cognitive connection with 
the mind-independent reality. Foundationalists, on the other hand, tried 
hard to overcome the challenging problem of explicating onto-epistemic 
mysteries revolving around the meeting point of our beliefs and the world. 
Sosa compellingly argued that if we want to understand “knowledge,” 
we have to look beyond interrelations among beliefs as well as any naïve 
notion of epistemic foundations. Accordingly, we need a unified view by 
which it can be shown that our beliefs about the world are grounded in our 
intellectual virtues so that we are able to achieve an important telos, to wit, 
knowing truth in a justified fashion.
Knowing Full Well continues to carry out Sosa’s familiar project in 
the direction of developing it further and bringing to full maturity. One 
chief reason why the project clearly occupies a distinguished place in the 
post-Gettier literature on propositional knowledge is that Sosa skillfully 
shifts the center of discussion from static, mental elements utilized for 
the purposes of conceptual analysis to the idea of performance both at 
the animal and reflective levels. The central epistemological question is 
put as follows: “What is the epistemic normativity that is constitutive of 
knowledge?” (2). To adequately understand the nature of that normativ-
ity, we need to grasp the concept of “performing well.” Although “per-
formance” lies at the heart of Sosa’s theory of knowledge, it would be a 
mistake to suppose that it is a quality peculiar only to human cognition 
or that it alone can enlighten our epistemic reality. For instance, even a 
mechanical structure like a bridge can be said to perform well if it with-
stands a storm. An agent’s performative success, by contrast, involves the 
execution of mental operations regarding knowledge, and equally impor-
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tantly, the agent’s possessing the higher-level capacity to do so in similar 
circumstances.
The striking idea of Sosa’s account is that humans’ performative 
achievements in epistemic contexts have a certain triple-A quality: In or-
der to count as knowledge, a belief must be accurate (veridical), adroit 
(competent or skillful qua doxastic state), and also apt (arising out of the 
general competence of the agent himself). Sosa uses the analogy of an 
archer’s shot to display different layers of the epistemic adequacy of a 
belief. The aim in archery is to hit the target, and this means that accuracy 
is an indispensable desideratum. Naturally, accuracy cannot be the end of 
the story; the shot is required to be skillful too. But a particular shot may 
just happen to be technically impeccable and yet not be performed by a 
sufficiently skillful archer. If the performer does not have that kind of a 
general skill, we have to say that despite being accurate and adroit, the 
shot is not apt. In a similar vein, the sort of epistemic normativity Sosa 
proposes has it that a true belief counts as knowledge only if the cognizer 
manifests a general competence in reaching the truth (more correctly, only 
if the belief’s accuracy and adroitness stem from the fact that the agent is 
sufficiently competent or apt in producing such beliefs).
According to the epistemological picture Sosa draws in Chapter One, 
human knowledge has an animal aspect at the first level. (A cat’s catching 
a mouse after chasing it is definitely a significant cognitive and physical 
performance in the sense of getting certain things right and realizing a cer-
tain end.) When such animal knowledge is aptly endorsed by the subject, 
we obtain the level of reflective knowledge. Sosa thinks, however, that 
in order to know full well, an agent must also have “meta-competence” 
which, as he explains, “governs whether or not one should form a belief 
at all on the question at issue, or rather withhold belief altogether” (12). 
Consequently, epistemic normativity is handled through a multi-layered 
performative structure which has sophisticated intellectual components as 
well as basic physiological building blocks.
We must mention at this point Sosa’s understanding of the notion of 
agency and how it complements his view on epistemic normativity (Chap-
ter Two). Sosa maintains that during belief formation we are mostly pas-
sive, which means that we do not consciously interfere with the natural 
process (imagine the formation of empirical beliefs like “This is a red 
rose,” “Madrid is the capital of Spain,” or “My parents love me.”) But at 
the same time we are in control of our beliefs. For example, even though 
our beliefs may be influenced by wishful thinking which may lead us into 
thinking in a way that would suit our pragmatic needs or goals, we are in 
general well capable of employing our rationality (or, “epistemic compe-
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tence”) and resist the temptation of non-epistemic influences. This may 
not always work ideally, but it is a notable feature of our cognitive life 
that, according to Sosa, deserves much credit and admiration.
That Sosa is cognizant of the actual limitations of flesh and blood 
agents shows itself frequently in his treatment of the concepts of “com-
petence” and “meta-competence.” For example, he thinks that being epis-
temically apt is certainly not an all or none affair. Consider the following. 
It stands to reason that an agent can be deemed fully apt if he has not 
merely a good doxastic connection with a given particular truth but also 
has some meta-level awareness of his own competence or adequacy in 
holding the belief in question. Yet, meta-aptness cannot be a strict require-
ment on our ordinary epistemic endeavors. As Sosa puts it, when an agent 
acts “on automatic pilot” (51), it would be too strong a criticism to declare 
that he is epistemically culpable. Thus, we cannot reasonably demand that 
an epistemic agent display infallible competence. What can be demanded 
is that he carries out likelihood assessments at a meta-epistemic level 
where appropriate.
At this point Sosa addresses the highly important question of the value 
of knowledge. We are inclined to value knowledge over mere true belief. 
But why? What is wrong with settling for “getting things right” regardless 
of the way it is realized in the actual world? Consider again the archer ex-
ample. Imagine an archer drawing extremely large circles on a board, then 
placing them nearby and hitting the target each time he tries. There is little 
doubt that in this example the telos (“getting it right”) is achieved, but at 
the same time few people would suppose that it is a remarkable accom-
plishment. This is the difference between “hitting the truth” and realizing 
that special state we call “knowledge.” Truths are innumerable; some of 
them are significant while many others are utterly trivial or worthless. 
Knowledge is different from mere true belief because the former is a result 
of practical engagements of the agent with the world and a reflection of 
the competence of the cognizer in a typical process of believing a proposi-
tion or deciding to withhold it. Truth does not involve aptness; knowledge 
does. Truth is the target of our onto-epistemic reality, and reaching it is ar-
guably a sign of success; but success, by itself, may “not necessarily have 
some objective intrinsic value…” (63). Knowing truth is different from a 
belief that is true because the former, generally speaking, contributes to 
our flourishing as individuals and as a society.
Chapter 4 is titled “Three Views of Human Knowledge” where Sosa 
contrasts his virtue epistemology with indirect realism and knowledge-first 
approach, arguing that it has theoretical advantages over the latter two. 
Indirect realism holds that propositional knowledge is derived through ab-
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ductive inferences from sensory data. Knowledge-first approach, on the 
hand, reverses the order of explanation and takes “knowledge” as the ba-
sic cognitive element in our ordinary experience of the world. And virtue 
epistemology, as one might expect, utilizes the notion of aptness to shed 
light on (the emergence of) human knowledge. Critical to this view is a 
distinction between “apt experience” and “apt belief.” Sosa remarks that 
“[o]nly apt believing is tantamount to knowing” (77). In an instance of, 
say, color perception, veridicality is related factors such as the competence 
of the agent’s visual system. The formation of the pertinent doxastic state 
and its epistemic aptness, however, is a logically distinct matter. Notice 
that unlike the knowledge-first approach, virtue epistemology retains the 
concept of “belief” and the classical form of epistemological analyses. 
But it goes beyond the traditional elements and discourses of the analysis 
and brings the notion of “competence” to the epistemic foreground. To 
see an application of this, consider the following. In a poorly illuminated 
large room I see a life-size photograph of a celebrity S from a distance 
and form the belief that S is in the room. Unbeknownst to me, S is really 
in the room immediately behind her life-size picture. Here one can talk 
about the veridicality of the experience; but it is clearly not a result of the 
competence of my vision. Since my perceptual belief is based on an ex-
perience that is not apt (due to perceiving objects in dim light), my belief 
cannot count as empirical knowledge. Now, consider the unlikely scenario 
that in that poorly illuminated large room I see a life-size photograph of 
a celebrity but, in a praiseworthy manner, recognize that it is not the real 
person using certain subtle perceptual cues and some background infor-
mation regarding the possible whereabouts of the celebrity. Here one can 
talk about the veridicality of the experience which is obviously a result of 
my competence as an agent. By way of such examples and the pertinent 
discussion provided in Chapter 4, Sosa contends that virtue epistemology 
can be characterized “as the view that knowledge is belief whose success 
‘creditable’ to the believer” (86). And this “creditability” includes aptness 
both at the first and higher levels of competence. In the next chapter he 
takes up contextualism, and, while admitting its significance, states that 
it is not to be considered as a fourth rival perspective along with the three 
mentioned above.
Chapter 6 addresses a highly important matter: the nature of propo-
sitional experience. Sosa raises a question about the exact nature of sense 
data (or sensa), frankly declaring that “[y]ears of . . . probing questions 
eventually left little life in sensa” (119). While the idea that non-proposi-
tional (“simple”) sensa lie at the bottom of propositional knowledge had 
always been a very popular among epistemologists, it is admittedly hard 
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to say that one can comfortably defend it in today’s onto-epistemic zeit-
geist. Yet, there is also the other side of the coin. Propositional states/enti-
ties (belief, hope, etc.) are fairly sophisticated entities or structures. Given 
that non-propositionality presents an issue in this context, are we really 
willing to say that sensa are also like belief or desire in terms of having a 
recognizable propositional content? Sosa comes up with the idea that, for 
example, visual experiences (i.e., image-like objects, not acts) are “vision-
phenomenal propositions.” The motivation behind this proposal is Sosa’s 
conviction that any viable analysis of experience must be able to accom-
modate such mental states/entities. But how can this conviction be justi-
fied given the well known ontological problems and theoretical misgivings 
about the nature of sense data? Let us again think analogically. Consider 
the description of an island in a novel. Just as that description functions 
pretty well in our comprehension without necessarily there being an actual 
island, so we can talk about, say, a sensum like “red triangular patch” ap-
pearing before our minds as a way of classifying our visual experience. 
In a nutshell, Sosa tries to find a place for epistemic intermediaries like 
sensa in his theory without falling prey into unsavory ontologizing. The 
issue is an intricate one, and Sosa admittedly does not offer a sufficiently 
comprehensive account of sensa and their role in humans’ knowing the 
world full well. Still, this lack is rather understandable in a book of such a 
modest length. In Chapter 7 Sosa talks about instrumental and testimonial 
knowledge within the framework of the account developed in the preced-
ing parts; and the last chapter complements the discussion with important 
considerations vis-à-vis epistemic circularity.
The reader of Knowing Full Well is rewarded with a compact, eas-
ily readable and wholly competent account of contemporary virtue epis-
temology based on the notions of performance and aptness operating at 
different levels of human knowledge. This book, without any doubt, will 
provide ample argumentative material for the debates of epistemologists 
in the foreseeable future.
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